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The Agony of Truth:
Martyrdom, Violence, and Christian Ways
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Chris K. Huebner




It is hard to resist the temptation to see truth as a kind of settlement,
as an agreement of some sort. We like to see truth as something
arrived at – the terminus of a journey or the endpoint of a
conversation. As David Hart puts it, “what is called truth is usually a
consensus wrested from diversity amid a war of persuasions.”1 By
this, I take it that Hart means to highlight the common assumption
that truth names a point at which things finally come together – a kind
of last word, where we reach a state of comforting, harmonious unity,
a sense of closure in which differences have been overcome once and
for all. In doing so, we assume that truth names what Rowan
Williams has called a “total perspective.”2 In a similar vein, we like
to speak of truth as a possession, as something grasped, and, when
grasped, something over which we have a certain mastery. We speak
as if truth is something we can handle, or perhaps as something others
are unable to handle. In doing so, we imply that truth belongs to an
economy of ownership and production, sometimes even of credit and
debt.
Let us group this collection of impulses together under the
heading of “standard epistemology.” Theologically speaking, it might
be said that these descriptions go some way towards spelling out what
is meant in the Christian tradition by the notoriously difficult term
“world.” What follows, then, is a series of gestures towards a counter-
epistemology that arises from the church’s confession that Christ is
the truth. Here truth will appear to be unsettled rather than settled. It
will bear traces of what, following Stanley Cavell, we might call a
“rationality of disagreement.”3 It arises from an excessive economy
of gift, and thus exists as a seemingly unnecessary and unwarranted
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donation. As such, the truth of Christ involves a kind of ongoing
contestation and thus cannot but appear to be inherently conflictual
when set beside the world’s desire for harmonies of closure. In short,
I shall suggest that if truth is understood by way of an analogy to the
truth of Christ, then it should be understood to name an essentially
agonizing and agonistic reality.
To put all this somewhat differently, this essay sets out to critique
and imagine an alternative to conceptions of knowledge that arise
from the assumption that faith and freedom are to be pitted against
one another as a kind of basic antinomy.4 From the perspective I will
be elaborating, the main weakness of any such approach is that it
seeks violently to guarantee or secure knowledge in some fixed
source or ground, whether such a ground is conceived in terms of
knowing subjects or objects known. Among other things, this is to
approach questions of knowledge and the university as if they are
intimately bound up with substantive ethical and political matters and
not to speak of knowledge in the procedural terms that characterizes
standard epistemology. In particular, I am interested in exploring how
Christian conceptions of knowledge are entwined with questions of
peace and violence. The guiding question that animates this
discussion, then, is “What sorts of knowledge are appropriate to the
Christian confession of the peace of Christ?” What follows is an
attempt to provide a few gestures towards a more peaceable – which
is to say more Christian – conception of knowledge. It is an exercise
in reading Christianity as a counter-epistemology against the
background of an assumption that Christianity names an
epistemology of peace. Among other things, such a view features no
basic opposition of faith and freedom, but rather a radical
transformation of the standard notions faith and freedom, not to
mention the idea of the university, as they are taken up into and thus
redefined by the body of Christ.
But I am not so much interested in the concepts of faith and
freedom as such, let alone with a conception of knowledge in general
or the idea of the university. Rather, I seek to draw attention to the
epistemological significance of martyrdom. More specifically, I am
interested in exploring how the practice of Christian martyrdom is
significant for a Christian conception knowledge and truth. Following
Hart, I assume that “theology must, because of what its particular
story is, have the form of martyrdom, witness, a peaceful offer that has
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already suffered rejection and must be prepared to suffer rejection as
a consequence.”5 One of the defining characteristics of the Christian
tradition is the assumption that it is the martyr who most meaningfully
has a claim to know the truth of Christ. And yet contemporary
Christian debates concerning the idea of the university and the kinds
of knowledge it enacts seem to take place in the absence of any
meaningful appreciation of the epistemological significance of
Christian martyrdom. So what might knowledge look like amongst a
people for whom martyrdom is a meaningful reality? What if truth is
spoken from the mouths of those, like Saint Apollonia, whose teeth
were knocked out and jaws cut in an attempt to silence her voice in
favour of those who would worship other gods?6 What if truth is
illuminated by the flames that consume those who sing out songs of
praise and thanksgiving while they are being burned at the stake?7
What if truth best captured by those whose desire for friendship with
God leads them to pray “O, how happy I would be were the Lord to
call me as a witness to his truth – what greater honor could come my
way from God?”8 What if truth is written onto the tortured bodies of
those who have disappeared “as part of the imaginative drama of a
certain state project?”9 In short, what if “the word of God will be
sealed with blood and defended with the cross?”10
Martyrdom and Instrumentality
Before turning to sketch out a vision of knowledge that seeks to
answer these questions, it will be instructive to examine more closely
how we typically speak of martyrdom, and in particular how we tend
to link martyrdom with the question of truth. In particular, I want to
identify three closely related claims that collectively define what we
might call the standard conception of martyrdom. Perhaps the most
common approach to martyrdom is to describe the martyr as one who
died for or because of her or his beliefs. The martyr is then defined as
one whose death is a consequence of a particular belief or set of
beliefs she or he happens to hold. Or rather, the martyr dies because
of an unwillingness to renounce certain beliefs even under threat of
death. Martyrdom is thus understood to be a possibility that might
arise when one is committed to the truth of a belief whose value is
taken to override the value of one’s life itself. As Brad Gregory puts
it, in what is otherwise one of the most interesting and illuminating
accounts of the phenomenon of martyrdom in the sixteenth century,
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“contested teachings such as papal authority, believers’ baptism, and
justification by faith alone already separated Christians from one
another. Martyrs demonstrated their willingness to die for these
beliefs, proclaiming that commitment to the truth outweighed the
prolongation of their lives.”11
Second, and building on the theme of unwillingness to flinch in
the face of death, martyrdom is often understood as a way of
conquering or controlling the threat of death. The martyr is thus
understood as one who defeats death by refusing to let death have the
last word. In other words, the value of martyrdom is that it
demonstrates that death no longer has power over us. Reflecting such
a position, Carole Straw has suggested that Christian martyrdom is
based on a “feeling of control over death and torture.”12
Third, and returning to the question of truth, martyrdom is often
spoken of as evidence or confirmation of the truth of a particular
belief. The stories of martyrs are often invoked in the service of a
larger apologetic project, which points to the willingness of people to
die for their beliefs as constituting at least a partial justification for
the truth of those beliefs. At their worst, it seems that this is how the
story of martyrs often function. Indeed, it might be argued that the
very idea of the martyrology was created for this sort of apologetic
purpose of securing the truth of the Christian faith.
What is instructive to note is that each of these three common
approaches reads martyrdom in a strikingly instrumentalist fashion.
They paint a picture of martyrdom as a more or less technological
concept. They imply, in other words, that martyrdom names a kind of
mechanistic process, whereby the martyr is understood and justified
by some end result that he brings into being, some change that she
effects. With respect to questions of knowledge, these descriptions of
martyrdom suggest a kind of two-stage process: first we come to hold
a particular belief that then leads us to act in various ways. In such
cases, the belief held is somehow taken to be meaningful or true in and
of itself, and martyrdom is understood to be a merely contingent
outcome that might follow from holding that belief depending on what
circumstances and political contexts one happens to find oneself in.
Martyrdom and Truth
Against such approaches, I want to paint a manifestly non-
instrumental picture of martyrdom. More specifically, I want to
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suggest that such instrumental conceptions of martyrdom radically
distort the very meaning of martyrdom itself. In short, I will argue
that martyrdom names an approach to knowledge and a way of life
more generally which assumes that the truth of Christ cannot
somehow be secured, but is rather a gift received and lived out in
vulnerable yet hopeful giving in return. On such a reading, the martyr
is not one who dies for or because of her beliefs. Rather, the death of
the martyr is in some meaningful way the very expression of belief
itself. Martyrdom does not arise out of a feeling of control over death.
Rather, it is but an expression of a way of life that gives up the
assumption of being in control. Martyrdom is not a phenomenon that
can be understood by appealing to instrumental notions of cause and
effect. Rather, it is a practice that involves the renunciation of an
overriding preoccupation with effectiveness. Accordingly, the martyr
is not to be invoked as evidence of the truth of a particular belief.
Rather, martyrdom is a practice that constitutes and makes intelligible
a certain kind of knowledge. Following Michel Foucault, I seek to
explore how martyrdom “engender[s] new domains of knowledge
that not only bring new objects, new concepts, and new techniques to
light, but also gives rise to totally new forms of subjects and subjects
of knowledge.”13 In short, I shall suggest that martyrdom is a practice
that contributes to the constitution of a people whose lives and deaths
require us to think of truth in some strikingly different ways.
It is worth emphasizing at this point that such an epistemological
reading of martyrdom does away with much of the apparatus of
contemporary epistemology – propositional truth-claims,
justificatory structures, and the like. It is less concerned with what
subjects might know or what objects might be known, and more with
matters of style or performance – a certain way of knowing. It is not
invested in the enterprise of identifying key beliefs and the actions
they might imply, but assumes that to know is to engage in the work
of the body. Accordingly, it sees knowledge neither as a purely
theoretical event that admits of practical application, nor as an
exercise of the mind that has certain implications for the body.
Rather, it approaches knowledge as an embodied social performance
or practice. It thus reads epistemology as a profoundly moral and
political enterprise. In general, I am suggesting that martyrdom is not
a product or result of what Christians claim to know. Rather
martyrdom names a distinctly Christian way of knowing, a way of
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knowing that is characteristic of the body of Christ, and in particular
a way of knowing nonviolently, a nonviolent body of knowledge.
Drawing on Hart once again, we might speak of the “style of the
martyr’s expenditure, which is made in the hope of a return that it is
powerless of itself to effect, but which is also made by a soul
committed to the grace of an infinite God who can always give souls
to one another in the dimension of peace, in the shared scope of his
infinite beauty. That such a gift can truly be given can be
demonstrated only by ceaseless giving.”14
Let me offer just a few brief observations in support of these
claims. First, it is important to notice that the witness of the martyr
does not turn on the ability to make truth fully present in a way that
suggests truth is something we have some sort of direct access to or
control over. For example, the martyrdom of Saint Apollonia turns
crucially on the sense in which her voice has been silenced. Indeed,
it might be suggested that the significance of Apollonia’s martyrdom
is that it displays a witness to truth that somehow happens precisely
because of the silence of her voice and not in spite of it. The witness
of Apollonia, who has been violently robbed of the power to speak, is
that of a speechless voice. The truth she embodies is reflected as
much, if not more, in those moments after she has been silenced than
in the threatening words her captors sought to erase. Her story is a
story in which silence is not given the last word. Hers is a voice that
cannot be silenced even as it is prevented from speaking, but that of
a witness that cannot be reduced to or captured by those possessions
known as words. This suggests that the truth of Christ is not merely
a belief uttered or expressed or otherwise made present by us. Rather,
it is a performance enacted in and through which truth is given as an
offering or gratuitous gesture. This has everything to do with the
question of agency. To identify truth with the voice of silence implies
that it is not something we are fully able to possess. This contrasts
starkly with the usual ways in which we think of ourselves as
epistemic agents whose knowledge turns on a voice that articulates
beliefs and thereby makes them present and thus grounds them in
some sort of settlement.
In a related sense, it is important to appreciate the sense in which
the martyr only exists as martyr in a way that is vulnerably dependent
on the being of others. In other words, martyrdom is not something
that we can bring about. Despite the temptation to invoke
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voluntaristic notions of willingness and unwillingness in the
contemporary portrayals of martyrdom noted above, it is crucial to
recognize that one cannot choose to become a martyr. Rather, the
notion of self-directed choice is the very antithesis of the logic of
martyrdom. As Gregory puts it, “the martyrs’ agency depended upon
relinquishing control, their strength upon a naked admission of their
utter impotence and total dependence on God.”15 This is partly
reflected in the fact that “martyr” is a title given by others to honour
those whose lives and deaths are said to witness the truth of Christ.
Martyrdom, in other words, is a work of memory. And yet it is
significant that the very practice of naming martyrs is a contested
one. The naming of martyrs is the work of the church, and this is by
no means an easy and straightforward task. It is an ongoing
hermeneutical exercise that requires a constant need for examination
and interpretation. Martyrdom is a meaningful description only in so
far as it is subject to ongoing interpretation and negotiation. The
figure of the martyr is under constant interrogation, not only by those
who bring about their deaths, but also by those who would honour
them. The very designation of martyrdom is a fragile and tenuous
one, existing as it does in a kind of suspension between the twin
extremes of suicide and victimhood. But the point I am making here
is that it is out of this very suspense that we can see the interruption
of the violent world of mastery, possession, and control by a non-
violent offering of a radically different way of being and knowing
called peace. There is a sense of otherness that characterizes Christian
ways of knowing. The “otherness of the church” in this respect has
everything to do with its attitude towards the other, its vulnerability
to the stranger and even the enemy.16 And it is this stance of
vulnerability, this refusal to seize control of one’s life, that is best
captured in the Christian practice of martyrdom.
The Agony of Truth
In an attempt to sharpen some of these all-too-vague gestures and to
lay bare the conversation partners lying behind the above reading of
martyrdom and epistemology, it will be instructive to draw attention
to some key moments in the work of Michel Foucault, Gillian Rose,
and John Howard Yoder. My suggestion that martyrdom constitutes a
counter-epistemology in which truth is seen as an agonistic reality
owes much to Foucault’s attempt to move from a conception of the
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subject as foundation to an appreciation of the notion of self-as-
sacrifice. In his essay “Truth and Juridical Forms,” Foucault opens
with the recognition that “[t]wo or three centuries ago Western
philosophy postulated, explicitly or implicitly, the subject as
foundation, as the central core of all knowledge, as that in which and
on the basis of which freedom revealed itself and truth could
blossom.”17 Against the background of such a claim, Foucault sets
out to construct a critical “genealogy of the modern subject” that
identifies and unsettles the particular forms of violence reflected in
this conception of the subject as foundation.18 Closely related to this
is Foucault’s critique of the notion that truth is grounded in origins,
that it is rooted in originary “seeds of knowledge.”19 In short,
Foucault claims that the modern idea of the subject as foundation is
but one more attempt to ground truth in a kind of originary source and
thus to secure or seize truth by means of a violent will to power.
Furthermore, Foucault maintains that this sort of violence is
particularly powerful because it is masked by the appearance of the
freedom of the subject. In an attempt to provide an alternative to this
temptation to the power of settlement, Foucault develops a reading in
which both truth and the self are redefined as agonistic notions, as
involving a sense of struggle, or a kind of ongoing contestation.
One of the main elements in this sense of agonistic dispossession
of both self and truth is Foucault’s reading of Christian practices of
martyrdom. It is worth quoting Foucault at length on this:
The revelation of the truth about oneself … cannot be dissociated
from the obligation to renounce oneself. We have to sacrifice the self
in order to discover the truth about ourselves, and we have to
discover the truth about ourselves in order to sacrifice ourselves.
Truth and sacrifice, the truth about ourselves and the sacrifice of
ourselves, are deeply and closely connected. And we have to
understand this sacrifice not only as a radical change in the way of
life but as a consequence of a formula like this: you will become the
subject of the manifestation of truth when and only when you
disappear or you destroy yourself as a real body or a real existence.20
Elsewhere, Foucault suggests that truthful speech (parrhesia)
involves a sense of risk, in which the self is put into a situation of
significant vulnerability. As Foucault himself puts it, “Someone is
said to use parrhesia and merits consideration as a parrhesiastes only
if there is a risk or danger for him in telling the truth.”21 In short,
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Foucault helps us see that a world in which martyrdom is a
meaningful reality sees truth not as a stable possession that we might
be able to capture fully, but as an agonistic sense of struggle in which
the notion of the self as an agent of truth is put in question.
Conversely, he suggests that where truth is understood agonistically,
we should expect that martyrdom will occur at least in part because
the self is not understood as a self-enclosed entity that is to be
preserved at all costs.
As instructive as I find Foucault’s reading of the self-as-sacrifice,
it is also necessary to emphasize that this does not entail the complete
erasure of the self. The notion of sacrifice implied in my reading of
martyrdom is not that of a “purified” or “one-way sacrifice.”22 It does
not call for a kind of total surrender to the other. It is at this point that
the work of Gillian Rose is helpful. One of the main features of
Rose’s work is her critique of the position she refers to as the “new
ethics,” and which she takes to be represented most straightforwardly
by the work of Levinas and Derrida. In particular, Rose is concerned
with the attempt to define “the ethical” in terms of a conception of the
purified otherness of the Other and the kind of one-way sacrificial
orientation it elicits. In short, Rose suggests that such a view covertly
participates in exactly the kind of violence it seeks to avoid. As Rose
herself puts it, 
New ethics would transcend the autonomy of the subject by
commanding that I substitute myself for ‘the Other’ (heteronomy) or
by commending attention to ‘the Other’. Yet it is the inveterate but
occluded immanence of one subject to itself and to other subjects that
needs further elaboration. Simply to command me to sacrifice
myself, or to commend that I pay attention to others makes me
intolerant, naïve and miserable…. [T]he immanence of the self-
relation of ‘the Other’ to my own self-relation will always be
disowned.23
Put differently, Rose worries that new ethics equally participates in
a violent vision of truth as ownership. It retains an underlying stance of
mastery, of being in control, in the sense that the logic of self-sacrifice
continues to presume the power of the self to give itself up. By contrast,
she argues that a genuinely non-violent account of truth as
dispossession or gift requires not a total giving of the self to the Other,
but an ongoing agonistic exchange of giving and receiving – of
generous receptivity or receptive generosity – that exists only when we
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refuse to settle the difference between self and other.24 Here Rose
suggests that truth is to be understood precisely in terms of the
categories of ambiguity, ambivalence, and anxiety of the self, and not
in terms of a dualism which forces us to choose between complete self-
presence or the total obliteration of the self. Genuine knowledge is that
which involves an appreciation of its own fragility and the necessary
risk of its endeavours. Here, truth is agonizingly difficult. It is an
agonistic work of engagement. Or as Rose herself puts it, “Certainty
does not empower, it subjugates – for only thinking which has the
ability to tolerate uncertainty is powerful, that is, non-violent.”25
Equally important to Rose’s critique of the new ethics is its
tendency to essentialize or hypostasize violence. The non-violent
thinking referred to in the above quote from Rose is to be
differentiated from what she refers to as a “peace beyond time.”26 In
other words, Rose’s appeal to peace is not an attempt to invoke a
reality that is somehow purified of violence. This is the sort of
approach she takes to be characteristic of the new ethicist. Peace for
Rose is neither a possession we can wield nor a wholly emptied
dispossession or pure sacrifice. Rather, peace names a sense of
struggle that exists against the background of a recognition that we
are always already implicated in some form of violence. To quote
from Rose yet again:
Instead of the monolithic, violent ‘coherence’ of ‘logic’ and
‘politics’, contrasted with the articulated peaceable ‘coherence’ of
Talmudic casuistry, with its perfect jurisprudence of general and
particular, this evident inversion [of peace] would be opened to an
exposition that can acknowledge that it does not know in advance
whether such institutions are violent or peaceful, for it is able to find
out – by reconstructing the changing relation between universal,
particular, and singular. This is experience – the struggle to
recognize: to know, and still to misknow, and yet to grow.27
In other words, peace is itself an agonistic reality. It does not
name a settled territory we can fully embody or own. It is not
something we own as a first instance called knowledge, which then
informs our actions. Rather, it is a gift that might be given through us
only when we no longer seek violently to control it. In the language
of this essay, it is the work of the martyr.
All that I find helpful in Foucault and Rose about these matters
of truth and agonism, of self and dispossession, of peace and violence
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I find reflected in the work of John Howard Yoder. And so I close
with a few references to the significance of Yoder’s work as an
attempt to spell out this vision of a non-violent body of knowledge
that is constituted and made intelligible by practices of martyrdom. In
particular, I seek to draw attention to Yoder’s emphasis on truth and
peace as witness, which is of course just another name for the martyr.
Much of this is captured in Yoder’s understanding of the set of
temptations he grouped together under the label of constantinianism.
But here it is crucial to appreciate that the question of
constantinianism and non-constantinianism names a form of
epistemological inquiry, and is not merely a question of “the
political.” In short, Yoder’s account of the constantinianization of the
church names a sense in which the church seeks to assume a stance
of control or self-legitimation. Instead of embodied discipleship in
practices of giving and receiving God’s gift of peace in Jesus Christ,
Yoder helps us see a church that has increasingly turned to a series of
self-legitimating strategies designed to ensure its ongoing survival.
Theology thus becomes preoccupied with the organization and
policing of time, with settlement and order, or what Yoder calls the
attempt to move history in the right direction. Such an approach
involves a denial of God, or at least signals an unwillingness to
receive God’s unpredictable future gifts. 
Yoder’s narration of the non-constantinian church, by contrast,
involves an attempt to articulate a non-violent counter-epistemology.
It names the kind of knowledge that is made possible because of the
lives and deaths of the martyrs. In particular, the knowledge of
martyrs it is not one that is preoccupied with epistemic justification,
but is shaped by the epistemological virtues of patience and hope. It
is an agonistic mode of knowledge that proceeds in fragments and ad
hoc alliances, not in terms of the development of large-scale
totalities. It is an epistemology that resists closure, refusing the lie of
the total perspective and the search for a purified idiom of speech,
recognizing that language about God is not finally limited to our
current vocabularies. And finally, it is a counter-epistemology
because it recognizes that theological knowledge is not a matter of
disembodied beliefs, the truth of which needs to be secured through
abstract rational analysis. Rather, the church resists the assimilation
of knowledge and violence because it recognizes that Christian
convictions are not possessions. In doing so, it operates as an
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embodied way of knowing rooted in charitable practices of giving
and receiving and especially in ongoing receptivity to life as a gift
from God. It recognizes that the faith of the church becomes
unintelligible when it is expressed in abstraction from a life of
disciplined imitation of Christ. The church does not develop and seek
to sustain a stable, settled body of knowledge, but engages in an
agonizing and ongoing conversational exchange of difference which
is truthful only when it proceeds in the absence of external
guarantees. It cultivates a readiness for radical reformation and an
appreciation of the sense in which it is always already involved in
some form of failure.
Conclusion: An Unsettled Truth
In conclusion, let me return to the question of faith, freedom, and the
idea of the university. Among other things, I suggested at the outset
that the conception of agonistic, non-violent enquiry I speak of makes
it possible to move beyond the standard impasse of faith and freedom.
It sees faith neither as a rival source of knowledge by which to secure
the necessity of truth, nor a threat to reason, but rather as a contingent
and thus inherently vulnerable gift which makes possible a new way
of understanding knowledge. Similarly it understands freedom
neither as a procedural hedge that guarantees us protection against the
“unfreedoms” imposed in the name of truth, nor as a threat to truth,
but rather as the expression of the fragility and vulnerability of
human reason. From the perspective of the contemporary university,
with its preoccupation with technical efficiency and explanatory
power or, failing that, its concern for the edification of the subject, I
recognize that this cannot but seem odd and almost entirely out of
place. But that is to say that the truth of Christ will be different and
look different than other ways of knowing. There is an otherness to
Christian ways of knowing that has everything to do with its
orientation towards the other. What then of the university and other
institutions that claim to be dedicated to the pursuit of truth? I confess
that I am tempted to say that it should be a place where we are free to
receive the gift of martyrs and, in so being, a place that is faithful to
the truthful witness that they embody. And I am fortunate that
Canadian Mennonite University, my academic home, strives to be
just such a university. But at the same time, Christians are a diasporic
people who know that they can be at home anywhere. So perhaps
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what is most important is that Christians embody faithful practices of
knowledge – to see the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity
as epistemological virtues – so that they can operate anywhere
precisely because they do not feel the need to control knowledge by
fixing it in some settled somewhere called the university. 
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